What changed in each release — new detections, hardening, fixes, and breaking changes. Every release ships signed binaries, SLSA provenance, and an SBOM on GitHub.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.11.1...v0.12.0
Windows was the only platform without a working zyrax-guard upgrade. Fixed.
Scoop bucket — install the signed release binary on Windows:
scoop bucket add zyrax https://github.com/tiagosilva07/scoop-zyrax
scoop install zyrax-guard
Manifest hashes come from the release's signed checksums.txt, and the bucket is regenerated automatically on every release.
upgrade delegates on scoop installs — Guard detects a scoop-managed install (scoop\apps\zyrax-guard\…) and runs scoop update zyrax-guard, the same way it already delegates to npm, Homebrew, and go install. --method scoop is accepted for manual override.
The standalone (non-scoop) Windows binary still upgrades manually via the Releases page — installing through scoop is now the recommended path on Windows.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.11.0...v0.11.1
One deliberate verdict-policy change.
BLOCK is now reserved for known-malicious packages — typosquats, hallucinated names, denylist and OSV MAL-* malware entries. A vulnerability advisory on a legitimate package (any severity) now yields WARN, with the severity shown in the message:
$ zyrax-guard check some-pkg
! some-pkg@2.1.0 — WARN
- GHSA-xxxx (high severity): Denial of Service in some-pkg
Why: popular packages routinely carry high-severity advisories — next and vite were BLOCKing installs over a real-but-ordinary DoS advisory. A false BLOCK on a household-name package teaches users to zyrax-guard allow it or remove the shell hook entirely, which destroys the gate's value against actual malware. BLOCK should mean "we think this is an attack", not "this has a known bug". Vulnerability management belongs to npm audit / Dependabot; Guard is the supply-chain attack gate.
If you want the old behavior in CI: run with --strict — WARN becomes a failure, so any advisory still fails the build.
Malware detection is unchanged: known-malicious packages BLOCK exactly as before, and ERROR (could-not-verify) still fails closed.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.10.0...v0.11.0
This release fixes every high-impact finding from a full code-quality and security audit of the CLI. Three focused PRs: core-gate bugs (#75), fail-closed hardening (#76), CLI cleanup (#77).
zyrax-guard upgrade now requires a cosign signature by defaultchecksums.txt ships in the same GitHub release as the binary, so checksum-only verification cannot detect a compromised release — only the identity-pinned cosign check can. upgrade (binary/curl|sh installs) now aborts if cosign is not installed, with instructions. To keep the old best-effort behavior, opt out explicitly:
zyrax-guard upgrade --require-signature=false # checksum-only (prints a warning)
npm/brew/go-managed installs are unaffected (upgrade delegates to your package manager).
scan crashed on npm monorepos — workspace entries ("apps/web") in package-lock v2/v3 paniced the lockfile parser. They're local packages, not registry deps, and are now skipped. (#75)install now installs the exact version it vetted — zyrax-guard install lodash@4.17.20 used to check the pin, then run npm install lodash (latest). The vetted name@version now flows through to npm/pip/cargo, and version strings are validated at the exec boundary. (#75)scan-agents <typo'd-path> no longer exits 0 — a missing or non-directory scan root is an error, not a clean pass. A CI gate can no longer silently scan nothing. (#75)check_package MCP result; a crafted summary could forge a ✓ SAFE line or carry a prompt-injection payload. All registry-derived text is now sanitized (control characters and hidden unicode stripped) before reaching a terminal or an agent. (#75)WeeklyLoads=0, which could false-BLOCK legitimate packages one edit away from a popular name. Unknown stats now skip the typosquat/popularity checks with a visible signal; a registry metadata failure fails closed with ERROR. (#76)--deep registry failures are visible — a 5xx while fetching the artifact used to silently report "no install/build scripts found"; it now surfaces as the documented "could not fetch artifact" note across npm, PyPI, and crates. (#76)scan-agents can't be evaded by oversized files — configs that are unreadable or exceed the 5 MB cap now produce a MEDIUM agent-config/unscannable finding instead of being silently skipped, and the cap is enforced on the read itself. (#76)--help exits 0 on every subcommand (was 2, breaking scripts). (#77)--deep) on check, install, and the check_package MCP tool, so a slow registry can't stall your shell hook or your agent. (#76)install --json for parity with check/scan/scan-agents. (#77)scan --ecosystem pypi falls back to requirements.txt when poetry.lock is absent (pip-tools projects). (#77)--help — including that ERROR (could-not-verify) fails closed regardless of --strict. (#77)internal/data/denylist.json) — grow it via data-only PRs. (#77)DiffLockfiles, NewNPM, the abandoned maintainer-change check). (#77)govulncheck@v1.5.0, staticcheck@v0.7.0) instead of @latest. (#77)cmd 45% → 56%, internal/report 31% → 75%.Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.9.1...v0.10.0
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.9.0...v0.9.1
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.8.2...v0.9.0
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.8.1...v0.8.2
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.8.0...v0.8.1
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0...v0.8.0
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.7.1...v0.7.2
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.7.0...v0.7.1
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.6.1...v0.7.0
Zyrax Guard now plugs straight into CI and installs in one line.
Gate every pull request. Drop Guard into a workflow and it checks the dependencies a PR adds. If one is a typosquat, known malware, a hallucinated name, or ships a risky install script, the check fails before it merges. Works with npm, PyPI, and crates.io.
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with: { fetch-depth: 0 }
- uses: tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard@v0
with:
ecosystem: npm # npm | pypi | crates
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/main/scripts/install.sh | sh
Downloads the signed binary for your OS/arch and verifies its SHA-256 (and the cosign signature when cosign is on your PATH).
Every binary is signed with keyless cosign and SLSA build provenance, and an SPDX SBOM is attached:
cosign verify-blob --bundle zyrax-guard-linux-amd64.cosign.bundle zyrax-guard-linux-amd64
Supersedes v0.6.0 (action description shortened to meet the Marketplace 125-character limit; no CLI behavior change).
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/commits/v0.6.0
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/zyrax-guard/compare/v0.1.0...v0.5.0
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/invoke-guard/compare/v0.4.0...v0.4.1
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/invoke-guard/compare/v0.3.0...v0.4.0
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/invoke-guard/compare/v0.2.0...v0.3.0
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/invoke-guard/compare/v0.1.0...v0.2.0
Full Changelog: https://github.com/tiagosilva07/invoke-guard/commits/v0.1.0